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I.

Introduction

Picking up a prescription is an experience most all Americans will have in their lifetime.
For many people, visiting the pharmacy is painless—your doctor sends a prescription, the
pharmacist fills it, and your insurance pays most or all of the bill. But what does it actually cost
to fill that prescription? More importantly—what does it actually cost the pharmacy and the
patient?
For Jeff Olson, these questions are answered daily. Jeff graduated from the University of
Iowa School of Pharmacy in 1993 when the pharmacy landscape looked much different than it
does today. After graduation, Jeff, a native Iowan, returned to his hometown to pursue a career in
independent community pharmacy. Upon returning, he became the co-owner and operator of
Montross Pharmacy in small-town Winterset, Iowa. Montross Pharmacy is a pillar of the
community in Winterset; in fact, it will be celebrating its 100th anniversary in 2021.
When Jeff became a partner in Montross in 1995, retail and community-based pharmacy
was a different endeavor than it is today. At the time, pharmacies and pharmacists served patients
primarily by filling prescriptions and providing counseling services. While these activities remain
Jeff’s primary focus, the situation has become more complicated. In the late 1990s, most patients
paid for their prescriptions in cash; however, as drug prices began to rise, prescription drug
coverage became increasingly common through private insurance companies and Medicare Part
D plans. This huge change in the pharmacy payment structure has created what Jeff calls the “Low
Pay-Slow Pay-No Pay” cycle.
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First: Low Pay. The low pay portion stems from low reimbursement rates. Because
pharmacies must spend money up-front to keep stock on the shelves, they must be reimbursed by
the insurance company for the cost of the medication and the cost to dispense it. This system is
primarily how pharmacies generate revenue. Over time, however, pharmacy reimbursement rates
have decreased drastically. Jeff accounts that he loses an average of $120,000 per year attributable
to low reimbursement costs.
Next: Slow Pay. Slow pay revolves around the Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR)
Fees that claw back additional money on prescriptions after the point of sale. These fees are not
applied, however, until months after the initial sale. Thus, pharmacy owners such as Jeff cannot
adequately prepare for the amount of money they will owe any given month. Jeff estimates that
about 3-6% of his yearly net profits, about $240,000 total, goes towards DIR Fees.
Lastly: No Pay. Audits performed on filled prescriptions claw back even more money from
the pharmacy. For example, money can be clawed back for something as simple as failure of the
pharmacist to strike through a hard-copy prescription or for calculating an inaccurate day supply
for a topical product, which is a difficult task to do precisely. Jeff has fallen victim to predatory
audits several times, citing that they are incredibly expensive and unpredictable, making it hard to
plan the pharmacy’s finances any given month or year.
Jeff loses approximately half a million dollars in revenue each year to the “Low Pay-Slow
Pay-No Pay” cycle. Jeff sees the effects of the losses as twofold: (1) decreased pharmacist job
availability and satisfaction and (2) lower value patient care. The monetary losses of pharmacies
across the country have detrimental effects on the pharmacy, patients, and overall health. For
many pharmacy owners across the country, Jeff’s story is a familiar one. Unfortunately, he is the
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rule and not the exception. This begs the question: why is this happening? Three words: Pharmacy
Benefit Managers (PBMs).
Most Americans have neither heard of PBMs nor have any idea what they have to do with
prescription drug costs. They are even less likely to be familiar with the dark, secretive side of
PBMs. This Comment will explore the terrifying truth of PBMs: the history of PBMs, insight into
the secretive practices of PBMs, and the ends to which PBMs are willing to go to make a profit.
Lastly, this Comment will prove that PBM money making schemes are closing pharmacy doors
for good, costing pharmacists jobs, and negatively impacting patient safety and access to quality
health care and affordable medications.
Part II of this Comment will explore what pharmacists do and why they are vital to health
care. Part III will take a deep dive into the depths of PBM business practices. Part IV will aim to
prove that PBMs historically and continuously skim money off the top of every pharmacy
transaction, which lowers pharmacy reimbursement rates, affects pharmacist job security and
satisfaction, and, ultimately, affects patient access to adequate and affordable health care. Finally,
Part V will discuss past, current, and future PBM regulation. Specifically, it will discuss former
President Trump’s eleventh-hour executive orders and regulations; President Biden’s proposed
regulations on drug prices; and future regulation and legislation.
II.

Pharmacists: What Do They Do and Why Are They Vital to Health Care?

A familiar question most pharmacists receive at some point in their career is an iteration of
the following: “Why do you have Dr. before your name? You are not a real doctor, right?”1 In

1

See Joseph Epstein, Is There a Doctor in the White House? Not if You Need and M.D., WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2020),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-there-a-doctor-in-the-white-house-not-if-you-need-an-m-d-11607727380
(urgin g
First Lady Dr. Jill Biden to “drop the ‘Dr.’” from her title because she is not a physician). But see Michael Levenson,
An Opinion Writer Argued Jill Biden Should Drop the ‘Dr.’ (Few Were Swayed.), N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2020),
4

fact, I have received this question several times. So, what exactly are pharmacists? And what can
they do? The answer: it depends.
A. Pharmacy Education Throughout the Years
A pharmacist who graduated before 2000 likely has a Bachelor of Pharmacy (B.Pharm),
rather than a Doctorate of Pharmacy. This is because in July 2000 the Accreditation Council for
Pharmacy Education (ACPE) mandated that all pharmacy schools offer a PharmD program to
receive accreditation. 2 This was not precisely when PharmD programs came on the scene,
however. In fact, the first earliest PharmD–like programs began in the 1940s after World War II.3
By the late eighties, only 56% of pharmacy schools exclusively offered bachelor’s degrees, while
14% offered only PharmD programs.4
The switch to PharmD programs meant a few things for students and faculty: (1) the
program of study was extended from five to six years; (2) experiential learning was introduced;
and (3) emphasis shifted to clinically-driven, patient-focused curricula.
programs were only five years of coursework.

Original B.Pharm

The common approaches were a two-year

undergrad, three years of formal pharmacy education; one-year undergrad, four years of formal
pharmacy education; or admittance into formal pharmacy education from high school. 5 As
PharmD programs were adopted, these structures remained largely unchanged. The most common
structure seen today is a two-year pre-pharmacy program, with four years of formal pharmacy

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/12/us/jill-biden-doctor-wsj.html (“‘If you have a doctorate in pharmacy or
education or biology, it doesn’t matter: Call yourself doctor . . . .’”).
2 Teeraporn Supapaan et al., A Transition from the BPharm to the PharmD Degree in Five Selected Countries, 17
PHARMACY PRAC. 1611, 1613 (2019).
3 See generally Joseph Fink, Pharmacy: A Brief History of the Profession, STUDENT DR. NETWORK (Jan. 11, 2012,
9:10 AM) https://www.studentdoctor.net/2012/01/11/pharmacy-a-brief-history-of-the-profession/; Supapapaan,
supra note 2.
4 Supapapaan, supra note 2.
5 Fink, supra note 3.
5

education. The additional year of the formal pharmacy education was added to require experiential
learning, called Advanced Pharmacy Practice Experience (APPE). 6
The largest change was within the curriculum. The traditional B.Pharm curriculum focused
heavily on medicinal chemistry, pharmacology, and compounding. After the switch, the
curriculum kept aspects of these elements but focused much more on a patient-centered approach.7
Another large change that arose from the advent of PharmD programs was post-doctoral
pharmacist specialization with the introduction of Post-Graduate Year 1 and 2 (PGY-1 and PGY2) and Pharmaceutical Industry Fellowship programs. A recent study found that on average over
five years, about 47.2% of PharmD graduates apply for PGY-1 residencies, with about 33%
accepting positions.8 Moreover, the American College of Clinical Pharmacy (ACCP) and the
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) recommend that all pharmacists
involved in “direct patient care [should] be required to complete a residency prior to entering
practice by 2020.” 9 This switch reflects the profession’s leaders overall agenda of involving
pharmacists throughout the patient-care process and not solely at the end.
B. Types of Pharmacy Practices
Whether it is an insignificant role in a TV show or a commercial featuring gummy vitamins
that are “Pharmacist Approved,” retail pharmacists are the most well recognized of the profession.
In fact, a recent study showed that about 65% of pharmacists practice in community–based settings
while 25% practice in hospital-based settings in the U.S.10 But pharmacists, and the profession as
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Supapapaan, supra note 2.
See Fink, supra note 3.
8 Katherine A. Kelley et al., Employment Trends for Doctor of Pharmacy Graduates of Research -Intensive
Institutions, 2013–2017, 83 AM. J. PHARMACEUTICAL ED. 148, 150 (2019).
9 Supapapaan, supra note 2, at 1614 (while many hospital system employers prefer residency -trained pharmacists, it
has not been formally required by accreditation standards).
10 Supapapaan, supra note 2.
6
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a whole, have drastically changed throughout the years.

This change is due to several

circumstances: advocacy by leaders, the switch from BPharm to PharmD, and the assessed need
in other clinical areas.
Pharmacists are now involved in a multitude of clinical practices, including Medication
Therapy Management (MTM), 11 ambulatory care practices, Managed Care Organizations
(MCOs), pharmaceutical industry, public policy, and association management.12 Through these
professional advancements, pharmacists have earned the ability to be “supplementary or
independent prescribers via [C]ollaborative [P]ractice [A]greements.” 13

The most common

example of this is the ability to administer vaccinations at the pharmacy, a more recent
advancement of the profession.

Lesser known Collaborative Practice Agreements permit

pharmacists to provide anticoagulation, diabetes, HIV, and contraceptive management services.14
C. Future of the Pharmacy Profession
Although the scope of professional pharmacist services has increased recently, there is still
room for improvement and expansion of practice. Pharmacists continue to fight to be recognized

Medication
Therapy
Management
(MTM)
Services,
AM.
PHARMACISTS
ASS’N,
https://www.pharmacist.com/medication-therapy-management-services?is_sso_called=1 (last visited Nov. 11, 2020)
(“[MTM] is a systematic process of collecting patient-specific information, assessing medication therapies to identify
medication-related problems, developing a prioritized list of medication-related problems, and creating a plan to
resolve them.”).
12 See generally Jon C. Schommer et al., Career Pathways for Pharmacists, 47 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N 563
(2007).
13 Supapapaan, supra note 2, at 1612; see National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion,
Collaborative Practice Agreements and Pharmacists’ Patient Care Services: A Resource for Pharmacists (2013),
https://www.cdc.gov/dhdsp/pubs/docs/Translational_Tools_Pharmacists.pdf (a Pha rmacist Collaborative Practice
Agreement (CPA) is “[a] formal agreement in which a licensed provider makes a diagnosis, supervises patient care,
and refers patients to a pharmacist under a protocol that allows the pharmacist to perform specific patient car e
functions”).
14 See generally Patti Gasdek Manolakis et al., Pharmacists’ Contribution to Primary Care in the United States
Collaborating to Address Unmet Patient Care Needs: The Emerging Role for Pharmacists to Address the Shortage of
Primary Care Providers, 74 AM. J. PHARMACEUTICAL EDUC. 1, 2 (2010) (discussing the roles of the pharmacists at
VA hospitals and clinics).
7
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as healthcare providers as a matter of law.15 The main purpose for seeking provider status through
federal legislation is to obtain reimbursement for services pharmacists currently provide. The
proposed legislation would “amend Title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for coverage
under Medicare program of pharmacist services.” 16 Although the full scope of the services
pharmacists are permitted to provide are individually mandated by each state, the proposed
regulation would formally classify pharmacists as healthcare providers and require reimbursement
for clinical services.17
The call for pharmacist provider status from industry leaders and professionals has gained
strength amid the COVID-19 pandemic. With a national physician shortage, and health care
systems and hospitals overwhelmed, pharmacists are ready and able to take over primary health
care concerns.18 For example, although pharmacists are permitted to administer vaccines in all
fifty states, some states limit the types of vaccines pharmacists may administer.19 Conferring
provider status would allow pharmacists to administer all vaccines without Collaborative Practice
Agreements or state approval, which could increase access to the COVID-19 vaccine and other
vaccines in the future. Provider status could also guarantee pharmacists adequate payment for the

15

See Pharmacy and Medically Underserved Areas Enhancement Act, S. 109, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill has not
yet been introduced during the current session; see also Patrick C. Harper, Pharmacist Provider Status Legislation:
Projections and Prospects, 55 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N 203 (2015).
16 Pharmacy and Medically Unserved Areas Enhancement Act, supra note 15.
17 See infra Part IV.A for a discussion on pharmacist-based clinical services.
18 Debbie Weitzman, Provider Status for Pharmacists: It’s About Time, PHARMACYTIMES (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/provider-status-for-pharmacists-its-about-time;
see
also
Pharmacy
Organizations Executive Summary, Pharmacists As Front-Line Responders For COVID-19 Patient Care 1, 2 (2020),
https://www.pharmacist.com/sites/default/files/files/APHA%20Meeting%20Update/PHARMACISTS_COVID19 Final-3-20-20.pdf.
19 Weitzman, supra note 18; see also Richard Hughes IV et al., The Pharmacist’s Role in COVID-19 Response Efforts,
H EALTHAFFAIRS.ORG (Jul. 23, 2020), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/provider-status-for-pharmacists-itsabout-time (explaining that “state laws frequently place limitations on pharmacist -vaccinations based on age, type of
immunization, and other requirements, such as parent or guardian consent or physician authorization”).
8

provision of acute access to COVID-19, flu, and strep testing, and other treatments for minor
ailments.20
D. Pharmacists’ Vitality to Healthcare
Why is provider status for pharmacists necessary to the health care system? Because
pharmacists are uniquely qualified to provide primary care and are the most accessible health care
providers.21 There is currently a shortage of primary care physicians in the U.S. The number of
new physician graduates that choose primary care as a career has fallen by 50% since 1997, and
only about 2% of all physician graduates plan to work in primary care settings. 22 In fact, it is
estimated that “over 56 million Americans lack adequate access to primary health care . . . .”23
With the baby boomer population reaching sixty-five years of age, and more people suffering from
chronic conditions, primary care services are needed now more than ever. In older populations in
particular, studies show that “28 percent of patients . . . take five or more chronic medications each
month.”24 The problems permeating the healthcare system require a shift by all professions to
improve patient access to care. Because pharmacists have a deep understanding of medication
management, adverse events, and diagnostic criteria, they are perfectly positioned to assume roles
within the primary care system.25
Pharmacists are also the most accessible health care providers to patients. 26 The lack of
access to a health care provider is specifically exacerbated in rural areas of the country. In fact,
about “20% of the US population—more than 50 million people—live in rural areas, but only 9%

20

Weitzman, supra note 18; Pharmacy Organizations, supra note 18.
See Pharmacy Organizations, supra note 18.
22 Manolakis, supra note 14, at 1.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See Pharmacy Organizations, supra note 18.
21
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of the nation’s physicians practice” in those communities. 27 Conversely, 90% of Americans live
within five miles of a community pharmacy, thereby making pharmacists the most accessible
health care provider to all American communities.28 Ensuring pharmacists and essential services
remain accessible to Americans requires proper pharmacist reimbursement, provider status, and
an expansion of pharmacists’ scope of practice.
III.

PBMs: Who Are They and How Do They Fit Into Healthcare?

Most Americans have likely never heard of Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs).
Whenever an American fills a prescription, however, they are utilizing PBM services. This is
because PBMs are the silent middlemen in all pharmacy transactions; they are perfectly positioned
between the manufacturers, health plans, and retail pharmacies. 29
PBMs were originally primarily responsible for what is called claims adjudication. 30 The
typical claims adjudication process goes as follows. A patient arrives at a pharmacy with two
things in hand: a prescription and an insurance card. The pharmacy then uses special coding
provided on the insurance card to bill the patient’s insurance for the prescription. This is actually
accomplished through a series of complicated computer transactions with the PBM. First, the
patient’s insurance information is transmitted to the PBM, which decides whether the patient’s
insurance covers the particular drug. If it does, the claim goes through; if not, it is rejected back
to the pharmacy. Assuming the prescription is covered, the PBM then transmits two pieces of
information back to the pharmacy: (1) the patient’s copayment, if any, and (2) the pharmacy

27

Roger A. Rosenblatt, Physicians and Rural America, 173 WESTERN J. M ED. 348 (2000).
Pharmacy Organizations, supra note 18.
29 See Alan Lyles, Pharmacy Benefit Management Companies: Do They Create Value in the US Healthcare System?,
35 PHARMACOECONOMICS 493, 494 (2017).
30 See Kwanghuyuk Yoo, Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Generic Pharmaceuticals Pricing Conspiracy: Unveiling
Lock-In Mechanisms, Structural Shortcomings and Antitrust Evidence, 64 S.D. L. REV. 43, 56 (2019) (discussing the
process of claims adjudication).
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reimbursement information. Lastly, the PBM determines how much to bill the health plan for the
transaction. Although claims adjudication was the primary impetus for PBMs, they have now
positioned themselves as the middlemen between many different actors.31
A. History of PBMs
The first-generation PBMs came on the scene in the late 1960s as insurance companies
began covering prescription medications.32 Health plans needed to outsource claims adjudication
for efficiency reasons, which gave rise to an entirely new health care business. As PBMs became
more popular, the model began to change. In the early 1990s, top pharmaceutical companies, such
as Eli Lilly, Merck, and SmithKline, purchased large PBMs to create formulary synergy. 33 This
new model allowed pharmaceutical companies to list their drugs as “preferred” through the PBMs
they respectively owned.34 Eventually this practice was challenged in a breach of fiduciary duty
class-action lawsuit, which provoked the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to “crack down on the
PBM/drug company alliance.”35 Although each pharmaceutical company sold their interest in
PBMs in the early 2000s, the evolution of the PBM business model had lasting effects.36
Today, there are three major, publicly-traded PBMs: ExpressScripts, OptumRx, and CVSCaremark. These PBMs are responsible for administering prescription drug benefits to over 180
million people—about 80% of the market.37 They have, essentially, utilized the formulary-based

31

See generally Lyles, supra note 29.
See, e.g., Lyles, supra note 29; Comments of David A. Balto to the Federal Trade Commission (Dec. 6, 2017).
33 Lyles, supra note 29.
34 See David Dayen, The Hidden Monopolies That Raise Drug Prices: How Pharmacy Benefit Managers Morphed
From Processors to Predators, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Mar. 28, 2017), https://prospect.org/health/hidden-monopoliesraise-drug-prices/ (“[Merck, Eli Lilly, and SmithKline] could then view competitors’ pricing information and place
their own drugs over their rivals’ on PBM formularies.”).
35 Id.
36 See Lyles, supra note 29.
37 Yoo, supra note 30, at 55.
11
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model that was projected in the original PBM/drug company alliances without triggering the FTC
antitrust regulation. The idea of consolidating into three major PBMs, instead of separate, smaller
health plans or PBMs, was for one effect: bargaining power—they are stronger together than
apart.38
PBMs’ current business model is best described as a wagon wheel: PBMs are the hub,
while the pharmacies, health plans, wholesalers, and manufacturers are the spokes that are all
interconnected themselves.39 First, PBMs contract with several health plans to create a patient
network. For example, according to their website, CVS-Caremark serves as the PBM for thirtynine different health plans, which amounts to about eighty million members. 40 Large patient
networks give PBMs sufficient bargaining power with the drug manufacturers to negotiate for
lower drug prices. Manufacturers will provide PBMs rebates in exchange for preferred spots on
their formulary.41 A PBMs’ formulary is a tiered system: the top tier consists of the most preferred
medications—typically, drugs from manufacturers with whom they have negotiated the highest
rebates. For example, a tiering system may commonly look like the following: “Tier 1—preferred
generic, Tier 2—non-preferred generic, Tier 3—preferred brand, Tier 4—non-preferred drug, and
Tier 5—specialty medicines.”42 As you get higher in the tiers, the more expensive the drug is to

38

See generally id. at 56.
Seeley, infra note 45.
40 CVS Health Plan Partners, https://www.cvs.com/health -insurance/medicare/health-plan-partners?icid=medicaretab-partners; see also Lyles, supra note 29, at 495.
41 Abigail Gore, Exposing the Middlemen in Rising Drug Costs: Modifying Safe Harbor Protections for Pharmacy
Benefit Manager Rebates Under Federal Anti-Kickback Statutes, 98 OR. L. REV. 297, 301 (2020); see also Balto,
supra note 32; infra Part III.B.1 discussing PBM rebate practices.
42 Lyles, supra note 29, at 495.
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the PBM, health plan, and, ultimately, the patient. 43 This formulary serves as the backbone for the
PBM claims adjudication and pharmacy reimbursement.44
B. PBMs’ Pricing Scheme
So, how exactly do PBMs make money? And why has this business model disrupted the
prescription drug market? In order to understand how the system has been exploited, it is important
to understand how the PBM business model was initially designed to work. There are three
primary ways in which PBMs make their money: (1) manufacturer rebates, (2) discounts on
pharmacy reimbursement rates, and (3) DIR fees. An overview of the PBM—health plan—
pharmacy interaction is shown in Figure I. A breakdown of each component will be explored in
the sections below.
Figure I 45

1. Rebates

43

See infra Part IV.C for a discussion on patient cost-sharing initiatives by health plans.
See supra Part III for an explanation of PBM claims adjudication; see also infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion on
pharmacy reimbursement.
45 Elizabeth Seeley, Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Practices, Controversies, and What Lies Ahead, C OMMONWEALTH
FUND 1, 2 (2019) https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2019/mar/pharmacy-benefitmanagers-practices-controversies-what-lies-ahead.
13
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PBMs first negotiate with the drug manufacturer for rebates on generic and brand -name
medications and then list these medications on their preferred formulary. 46 Manufacturer rebates
serve two purposes: (1) to provide payment to the PBM for the service of negotiating and (2) to
pass savings on to the health plan, overall lowering the price for prescription medications. 47 Over
time, however, the manufacturers have utilized rebate negotiations in exchange for better
formulary placement and increase market share for their products.48
PBMs negotiate up to a 40% discount off of the list price of the drug. It is estimated,
however, that the average rebate price is around 14%, which is to be paid to the PBM by the
insurance company after the point of sale at the pharmacy.49 A 2015 study found that the rebates
manufacturers offered to PBMs “totaled about $58 billion of the $350 billion in total gross
expenditures for brand name drugs . . . .”50 PBMs are then supposed to pass on 90% of the rebate
to the health plan, which should ideally pass savings to patients in the form of lower premiums
and copayments.51
For example, LipitorⓇ (produced by Pfizer) and ZocorⓇ (produced by Merck) are both
used to treat hyperlipidemia or high cholesterol. If LipitorⓇ’s list price is $150 and Pfizer offers
a 40% rebate, the cost of the drug to the health plan is $90 post-rebate. If ZocorⓇ’s list price is
$100 and Merck offers a 30% rebate, the cost of the drug to the health plan is $70 post-rebate.
Barring all other considerations and assuming the medications have equivalent efficacy profiles,
the PBM should pick ZocorⓇ as the preferred medication because the drug price and rebate

See supra Part III.B for a discussion on PBMs’ preferred formulary model.
See generally Seeley, supra note 45; see also Gore, supra note 41, at 302.
48 Gore, supra note 41, at 302.
49 Yoo, supra note 30, at 73.
50 Id. at 75.
51 Seeley, supra note 45, at 3.
46
47
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combination offer the lowest price. Under that scenario, the PBM would pass $27 dollars in rebates
to the health plan and make a profit of $3 on each ZocorⓇ prescription filled by a patient. This,
however, is not what often occurs.
In fact, there are three distinct problems that have emerged from PBMs’ rebating system:
(1) decreased rebate savings passed through to insurance companies, (2) increased manufacturer
drug prices, and (3) increased cost-saving and cost-sharing mechanisms for patients. First, because
of lack of regulation and transparency, PBMs are not required to disclose the rebates they obtain
from manufacturers on each drug.52 Thus, PBMs are not incentivized to choose the lowest priced
drug, but instead the drug with the highest rebate regardless of overall cost. Moreover, many
speculate, and there is evidence that PBMs do not pass the full 90% of the rebate to the health
plans.53 This has detrimental effects on prescription drug costs to the health plan.
Revisiting the earlier example: even though ZocorⓇ was the lower post-rebate cost
medication, in reality, the PBM would likely choose LipitorⓇ. This would allow the PBM to
instead pass $54 in rebates to the health plan and make a profit of $6 on each LipitorⓇ prescription
filled, yielding twice the profit for the PBM on each prescription filled than it would earn on
ZocorⓇ. Further, PBMs are unlikely to pass the full 90% rebate through to the health plan.
Assume the PBM in this scenario only passes 85% of the rebate to the health plan. The health plan
would only receive $51 in rebates and the PBM would then profit $9 on each LipitorⓇ prescription
filled. The health plan would now have to pay $93 dollars for the prescription, as compared to the
original $90. While a $3 loss per prescription may seem negligible in the long run, it has the

52

See generally Lyles, supra note 29 at 497; Balto, supra note 32.
Gore, supra note 41, at 302; see Seeley, supra note 45, at 3 (“[S]mall payers and employers have reported that they
did not receive this share (i.e., 90%) of savings.”).
15
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potential to have a huge impact on health care spending when extrapolated to encompass every
drug paid for by the health plan.
Second, aggressive negotiating by PBMs for higher rebates from manufacturers results in
an inverse increase in drug pricing.

Industry professionals and thought leaders often blame

investment in innovation and Research and Development (R&D), and other considerations, such
as patent and regulatory exclusivity, as responsible for increased drug prices.54 The cost of R&D,
however, only accounts for 15.2% of the ten largest pharmaceutical companies’ total annual
revenue. 55 If innovation costs are so low compared to annual revenues, then what is the
justification for such high drug prices? The answer is that the United States is the only country
that allows manufacturers to set their own drug prices.56 Therefore, drug manufacturers set drug
prices “primarily on . . . what the market will bear.” 57 For example, LantusⓇ is a popular longacting synthetic insulin sold world-wide for the treatment of Type I and Type II diabetes. In 2015,
the average cost of LantusⓇ in the U.S. at fifty units per day pre–rebate was $372.75. In contrast,
the price of LantusⓇ at fifty units a day in Canada, France, and Germany was $67.00, $46.60, and
$60.90, respectively.58 This means, at best, America’s price for the same prescription drug from
the same manufacturer is 5.6 times higher than other countries.
This independent pricing model is further complicated by PBMs’ use of market power to
pressure manufacturers into providing higher rebates each year. In a perfect world, the rebates are
supposed to keep drug prices low; in reality, however, to make up for costs manufacturers provide

54

See Kesselheim, supra note 62, at 863.
See id. (discussing results in Table 4 from a 2014 study of Sales and R&D Costs).
56 Id. at 860.
57 Id. at 863.
58 Id. at 859.
55
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in discounts in one year, they send drug prices soaring the next.59 For example, in 2016, Eli Lilly’s
HumalogⓇ, a popular short-acting insulin for the treatment of diabetes, was more than double its
price in 2011. 60 When reporters from the Wall Street Journal inquired about the stark price
increase, Lilly reported that they were actually making less on HumalogⓇ in 2016 than in 2009.61
The reason? PBMs’ continuous demand for higher rebates in exchange for preferred placement
on formulary lists.
Lastly, because rebate savings often are less than anticipated by the health plans, they are
required to employ several other strategies to keep premiums and escalating drug costs down.
These tactics usually take form in patient cost-sharing initiatives, such as copayments or high
deductible plans.62 These tactics will be discussed in further detail in Part IV-C.
2. Pharmacy Reimbursement Rates: “The Pricing Horribles”
PBMs continually make a profit from discounts and claw-backs on pharmacy
reimbursement rates. A pharmacy’s reimbursement consists of two components: ingredient costs
and the dispensing fee. 63 First, because the pharmacy must front most of the cost to keep
medications in stock, they must be reimbursed by the PBM for the cost of obtaining the medication
from the wholesaler. 64

Second, the dispensing fee pays for materials required for filling

Gore, supra note 41, at 302; see also Denise Roland and Peter Loftus, Insulin Prices Soar While Drugmakers’ Share
Stays Flat; Role of Health-Care Middlemen Fuel Market with Higher List Prices; Deep Discounts are Available to
Some, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2016) https://www.wsj.com/articles/insulin-prices-soar-while-dru gmakers-share-staysflat-1475876764.
60 Roland & Loftus, supra note 59.
61 Id.
62 See Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United States: Origins and Prospects
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prescriptions (e.g., amber vials and bags) and labor costs (e.g., pharmacists and pharmacy
technicians).65 Dispensing fees and patient copayments are the primary ways pharmacies make a
profit from filling prescriptions.66
In order to understand pharmacy reimbursement, it is important to understand the complex
pricing system and flow of money between health plans, PBMs, and pharmacies. The price paid
to the wholesalers is called the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC). 67 This is the price at which
manufacturers sell drugs to wholesalers and pharmacies. 68 This is not, however, the price used in
the pharmacy reimbursement calculation.
Instead, pharmacy reimbursement is calculated using one of three other price benchmarks:
Average Wholesale Price (AWP), Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC), or Average Manufacturers
Price (AMP).69 The AWP is not the actual price of the medication; instead, it is “an artificial
benchmark set by the drug manufacturer.”70 Manufacturers and PBMs also use AWP during rebate
negotiations.71 AWP is the WAC plus a 12–20% markup.72 Conversely, MAC is the “upper limits
that PBMs or health insurers pay retail pharmacies for generic . . . and . . . brand drugs.” 73 This
rate is determined by using the average published AWP or WAC prices. Generally, MAC prices
are 50–60% lower than AWP prices.74 Different from WAC or AWP, AMP is the actual sales
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69 See id. at 61; Causey, supra note 64.
70 Yoo, supra note 30, at 60.
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price reported by manufacturers.75 Therefore, AMP prices are usually lower than WAC or AWP
prices, but higher than the actual acquisition cost to the pharmacy.
How exactly does “the pricing horribles” scheme fit into pharmacy reimbursement rates?
To keep copayment and reimbursement rates lower, PBMs will contract with certain retail
pharmacies to create pharmacy “networks.” Large, corporate chain retail pharmacies, such as
Walgreens and CVS, will then offer discounts on different price points (AWP, AMP, and MAC)
to negotiate for a better position within the PBMs’ preferred network.76 For brand medications,
PBMs typically calculate a pharmacy’s reimbursement based on AWP, less any pharmacy
discounts, plus a dispensing fee.77 Pharmacies typically purchase medications based on WAC, but
will offer a discount of about 12–15% of AWP (recall that AWP is WAC plus a 12-20% markup).78
Thus, pharmacies are generally reimbursed the exact amount it costs to acquire brand named
medications from the wholesaler.
For generic medications, PBMs typically reimburse pharmacies based on MAC prices. 79
PBMs keep MAC list prices private, however, and do not allow health plans to see the actual
reimbursement to pharmacies.80 Thus, PBMs charge the health plan a higher amount for the drug
while reimbursing the pharmacy at the listed MAC price, creating what is known as spread
pricing.81 For example, a PBM in Ohio “reimbursed pharmacies 2.3 billion and billed Medicaid
2.5 billion . . . , resulting in a spread of $200 million” in profit to the PBM.82 Not only do PBMs
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profit from the spread, they also profit from slowly updating MAC lists. Ideally, MAC is typically
on par with WAC, meaning the pharmacy is reimbursed at or slightly above cost for generic
medications. This is to induce pharmacies to fill for lower cost generics instead of brand
medications. When manufacturers raise the prices on generics, however, PBMs are slow to correct
MAC pricing.83 This means that WAC is now substantially higher than MAC, which results in
pharmacies being reimbursed less than acquisition cost. Conversely, if the manufacturer drops the
generic price, PBMs quickly update the MAC list, ensuring pharmacies are not reimbursed more
than their acquisition cost.84 Because of the need to compete for the PBMs’ business, pharmacies
are not able to be reimbursed at a markup like a typical business. Instead, they are reimbursed at
or below cost, which lowers their overall profit on each prescription.
Moreover, the payment for dispensing the medication does not reflect its actual cost. A
study conducted in 2007 noted that while it typically costs around $10.50 to dispense a
prescription, most pharmacies were only reimbursed a dispensing fee around $4.50 on average.85
A more recent study calculated the average cost of filling a prescription at $12.40, with $7.22 of
that cost directly attributed to payroll expenses.86 Thus, pharmacies are reimbursed at or below
what it costs to purchase the medication and cost to dispense the medication, which leads to an
overall net loss on each prescription filled.

“The Pricing Horribles” stands as a barrier to

pharmacies making a profit from their main business model: selling prescriptions.
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3. Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR) Fees
The final piece of the PBM profit scheme is Direct and Indirect Remuneration (DIR) Fees.
DIR Fees were initially implemented by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) upon the
enactment of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. 87 The statute requires PBMs to send an
annual report to CMS encapsulating the gross cost of prescription drugs that were not captured at
the point of sale. 88

For example, PBMs are often provided additional discounts from the

manufacturers after the point of sale in the form of supplemental rebates or patient co-pay
assistance programs, such as manufacturer coupons. 89 Because the federal government aims to
keep drug costs low for taxpayers, CMS intended DIR reports to provide them with the accurate
costs of medications to reimburse at the lowest cost possible. 90 In theory, this retrospective
analysis should provide pharmacies with a more accurate reimbursement rate; however, PBMs
have vastly expanded the scope of DIR Fees.
PBMs use DIR Fees for many different fees, such as, “costs for pharmacies to participate
in a Part D preferred network, price reconciliations based on contractual rates, compliance fees for
contract-based performance metrics, or a combination of these fees.” 91 In reality, PBMs are using
DIR Fees as a way to claw back additional money from the pharmacy after the point of sale.92 In
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fact, most pharmacies report that PBMs are applying DIR Fees months after the initial sale, making
it nearly impossible to predict how much money a pharmacy will owe to a PBM any given month.93
One example of DIR Fees is tied to CMS’s “5-Star” ratings.94 CMS puts forth patient
quality metrics and standards, such as medication adherence to regimens for chronic conditions
like diabetes, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia. 95 PBMs with better patient quality metrics will
receive a higher 5-Star rating from CMS.96 This 5-Star rating then directly correlates to how much
a PBM is reimbursed on Medicare Part D claims. 97 To ensure that patients who utilize the PBMs
services meet these metrics, PBMs perform audits on pharmacies. For example, PBMs will
measure how often and likely patients are to refill their prescriptions on time as a way to measure
the patient’s adherence to the medication regimen—a measure over which a pharmacy has little
control.98 Then, based on the adherence data, the PBM will assign a performance rating to that
particular pharmacy.99 The lower the performance rating, the higher the DIR Fees that are imposed
on that pharmacy.100 This is a way for the PBM to make up the difference in cost from CMS for
a lower 5-Star rating. The average amount of these DIR Fees can be anywhere from $2 to $12 on
each claim.101 Further, if a pharmacy’s performance rating continues to remain low, the PBM will
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use it as a way to negotiate lower reimbursement to the pharmacy through continual DIR Fees or
lower preferred network placement.102 Failure to pay the fees will result in the pharmacy being
removed from the preferred network list entirely, leaving patients to find a new pharmacy
altogether.103
Initially, the fees were only for Medicare Part D claims, however, there is evidence that
most PBMs have started using these fees on private insurance claims as well, clawing back even
more money from pharmacies.104 The PBMs argue that the savings from DIR Fees are passed onto
health plans, which subsequently lowers premium and copayment costs to patients. 105 There is no
evidence, however, that PBMs actually pass any revenue of DIR Fees to the health plans.106 In
fact, the evidence indicates that PBMs’ DIR Fees actually increase patient costs.107 Because PBMs
are not required to report DIR Fees, they obscure the actual cost of the medication, keep MAC
prices higher, and retain the profits from lower reimbursement rates to pharmacies. 108 This
particularly affects patients who use Medicare Part D by forcing them into the “donut hole” faster
and requiring them to pay for their medications out-of-pocket.109 Higher drug costs also require
CMS to allocate additional taxpayer dollars to fund Medicare Part D.110
IV.
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How PBM Pricing Schemes Affect Pharmacies, Pharmacists, and Patients.
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While rebates, reimbursement rates, and DIR Fees may seem negligible in isolation,
together they create catastrophic effects on the health care system and most notably on retail
pharmacies, pharmacists’ wages, and patient’s pocketbooks.
A. Retail Pharmacies: A Dying Breed?
Retail pharmacies are hit the hardest by PBMs in two distinct areas: (1) reimbursement
rates and (2) DIR Fees. As explained above, a pharmacy’s reimbursement consists of both
acquisition and dispensing costs. Because of MAC and AWP price gouging, pharmacies are being
reimbursed at or below acquisition costs for medications. 111 Additionally, pharmacies’ dispensing
fees are often reimbursed below the actual cost to fill a medication. 112

Together, low

reimbursement rates hinder a pharmacy’s ability to make a profit. Next, PBMs employ large DIR
Fees on pharmacies, which claw back additional revenue.113
The combination of these two factors create an unsustainable business model, making it
difficult for pharmacies to keep their lights on and doors open. For example, Cleveland Clinic has
eighteen retail pharmacy locations and one specialty pharmacy. In 2017, it reported over $250,000
in DIR Fees alone, doubling the amount it paid in those fees in 2015.114 Don Carroll, Associate
Chief of Pharmacy at Cleveland Clinic noted that as the number of prescriptions its pharmacies
filled increased, the DIR fees increased as well, “but . . . declining to participate in pharmacy
networks of large national PBMs would cut off Cleveland Clinic’s pharmacies from a large portion
of its customers . . . .”115
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This presents a large, gaping hole in the PBM–Retail Pharmacy relationship: bargaining
power. Large, corporate retail pharmacies can bargain for better placement on preferred network
lists by providing higher discounts on acquisition costs (i.e., AWP/MAC prices).116 Additionally,
corporate pharmacies attached to large grocery store chains are often able to make up margins lost
in pharmacy DIR Fees and low reimbursement rates through grocery or other sales. 117 This
problem is further exacerbated by the fact that two of the largest corporate retail pharmacies, CVS
and Walgreens, own two out of the five largest PBMs, CVS/Caremark and Envision,
respectively.118 This reinforces large-scale “vertical integration in the supply distribution chain”
and allows pharmacy-owned PBMs to set their own pricing and force others to follow suit.119
Those “others” left out in the cold are often independent and rural retail pharmacies.
Independent pharmacies lack sufficient bargaining power against PBMs. 120

This means

independent pharmacies face “take-it-or-leave-it” deals; if they turn down the PBMs, they are
required to turn away patients that utilize the PBMs’ services. 121 But if the pharmacy accepts the
deal, they’re subject to huge profit losses. 122 The lack of profit from filling prescriptions sends
independent pharmacies, and even large retailers, into a financial tailspin. A study in 2019 found
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that, from 2009 to 2015, about 9,564 (12.8%) pharmacies closed their doors.123 The study showed
that independent pharmacies suffered most of the blow. Approximately 27% of the pharmacies
that closed in urban areas and 23% of the pharmacies that closed in rural areas were independent
pharmacies.124
Even local, grocery store-backed retail pharmacies, however, are having to shutter
operations. For example, California-based Raley’s Supermarkets shut down twenty-seven of their
nearly one-hundred locations, citing “high operating and drug costs, and low reimbursement rates
from Medicare, [California State Medicaid], and private health insurers.”125 With drug prices
steadily increasing, reimbursement rates remaining low, and DIR Fees at an all-time high,
independent pharmacies are struggling to come up with ways to make ends meet.
To increase and diversify revenue streams, many pharmacies have begun offering different
types of clinical services. These services include Medication Therapy Management (MTM) and
Comprehensive Medication Reviews (CMRs), Medication Synchronization, immunizations, and
adherence measures.126 Although these services are great ideas in theory, there are several barriers
to execution. First, it remains an open question whether pharmacies are properly reimbursed by
PBMs for these services. One study found that most payers recognized the potential cost-saving
of allowing community pharmacies to provide additional services, but had concerns about financial
and legal risks. Payers recognized that if “pharmacists ha[d] the regulatory ability to provide
services, then the payer organization could have negotiations as they would with a physician’s

123

Jenny S. Guadamuz et al., Assessment of Pharmacy Closures in the United States from 2009 through 2015, 180
JAMA I NTERNAL M ED. 157 (2019).
124 Id.; see also Abell & Balick, supra note 116, at 24.
125 Abell & Balick, supra note 116116, at 23, 25.
126 See generally Abell & Balick, supra note 116116, at 27; Tom Kosty, Retail Pharmacy Clinical Services: Influence
of ACOs & Healthcare Financing Model, (June 25–27, 2015), presented at American Society for Automation In
Pharmacy 2015 Midyear Conference.
26

practice.”127 Lack of federal provider status obstructs the pharmacy profession from providing
vital services to the community and realizing additional revenue streams that would allow
pharmacies to keep their doors open.128
Pharmacies closings often have negative implications on patient health. In rural areas in
particular, pharmacists may be the only accessible health care provider for patients, which makes
pharmacists absolutely vital to primary care functions.129 Pharmacists provide several primary
care functions for patients, such as counseling on adverse drug events, drug interactions,
medication therapy management, adherence, and over-the-counter remedies. 130

Moreover,

pharmacists often serve as the first line of triage for patients, instructing them to seek further
physician consultation in an office visit, urgent care, or emergency room.

These patient

interactions with pharmacists can make the difference between detrimental disease progression
and remission or cure.
B. Pharmacists: The Wage Wars
In order to lower overall costs associated with running a pharmacy, many pharmacies have
begun a series of layoffs, hiring freezes, and decreased wages. 131 For example, in 2019, Walmart
laid off about 3% of its pharmacy staff, in which about half was senior staff.132 This has led not
only to a lot of pharmacists being out of work, but increased burdens on the pharmacists that
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remain.133 For example, a high-volume store that normally requires two pharmacists working
simultaneously, may now only have one pharmacist working the full twelve-hour shift. 134
Similarly, a 2016 study reported that 61% of responding pharmacists found their workload to be
high or excessively high and that it had increased or greatly increased over the past year. 135 The
burdens and demands of the fast-paced workflow do not allow pharmacists to provide clinical
benefits to patients. In fact, the above 2016 study found that increased workload infringed on the
ability of pharmacists to adequately solve drug therapy problems, prevent or reduce potential
errors, and spend adequate time counseling patients—all vital functions to effectively serving
patients.136
Pharmacists wages have also been significantly cut over the years. In the late 1990s and
early 2000s, the demand for pharmacists was high and the number of pharmacy schools and
graduates increased rapidly.137 Although necessary at the time, it has now led to market saturation.
Rumblings across pharmacy blogs, Reddit pages, and inner circles offer proof that oversupply and
lack of demand for pharmacist services has created a wage crisis for many. One Reddit user claims
that, in 2016, they were offered a staff position with a corporate chain pharmacy at $58 per hour.138
In 2017, however, that same corporate chain pharmacy was offering new graduates only $56 per
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hour.139 While that example may only be a modest decrease, with pharmacy school tuition rates
rapidly increasing and potential wages lowering, pharmacy education is becoming a bad
investment. For example, most pharmacists graduate with an average student loan debt of
$213,000.140 While approximately 15,000 pharmacists graduate each year, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics projects a negative 3% job growth for pharmacists over the next ten years.141 What
exactly are new graduates with mounting student loan debt expected to do for an adequate returnon-investment?
The culmination of these burdens leads to pharmacist burnout and patient safety concerns.
One study found that 53.2% of pharmacists experience high levels of burnout. 142

Most

pharmacists in the study cited emotional exhaustion, reduced personal accomplishment, and
depersonalization as reasons for professional burnout. 143 Another study across all healthcare
professions found that burnout can result in increased medical errors and patient safety risks. 144
C. Patients: Hitting ‘Em Where It Hurts—Their Pocketbooks
One of the most prominent consequences of PBM pricing schemes was the implementation
of patient cost-sharing initiatives, particularly for older adults on Medicare. In order to make up
for the costs insurance companies are losing in rebates to the PBMs, payers initiated four types of
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cost-sharing programs: premiums, copayments, deductibles, and the “donut-hole.”145 While only
premiums and copayments are utilized by private insurers, Medicare Part D programs often
employ all four cost-sharing strategies.146
The earliest two strategies employed in cost-sharing initiatives were premiums and
copayments. Premiums, which have been employed for the longest, require that the patient
essentially “pays-to-play.” The premium is the amount the patient pays monthly or yearly in
exchange for prescription and medical insurance coverage. 147 Although premiums are not
unfamiliar among other types of insurance coverage, health insurance premiums have significantly
risen over time. In fact, from 1999 to 2016, private health insurance premiums rose by 213%,
compared to an increase in employee’s wages and overall inflation at 60% and 44%,
respectively.148
Due to patient dissatisfaction over premium increases, health plans initiated copayments to
offset some of the costs. Copayments are what the patient pays out-of-pocket at the pharmacy to
supplement the insurance coverage of the prescription. 149 The pricing of copayments varies
dramatically and many factors influence a patient’s copay. The biggest influences on copayments
are a patient’s premium payment, preferred or non-preferred medication, PBM tier lists, and the
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patient-selected plan.150 While a patient’s copayment can be as little as a few cents, patients can
also experience copayments that are thousands of dollars.151
Two large influences on a patient’s copayment are whether they have selected a high
deductible plan or are in the “donut-hole.” High Deductible Health Plans (HDHPs) and the “donuthole” are two of the newest types of cost-sharing initiatives.152 HDHPs allow patients to exchange
lower premiums for higher out-of-pocket costs up front.153 Therefore, there is no coverage on the
cost of medications until the patient pays the requisite amount for their insurance to “kick-in.”
HDHPs have become increasingly more popular over the years, growing from 4% in 2006 to 29%
in 2016.154 Further, high deductibles have become even higher over the years. From 2006 to 2016,
the average deductible “grew from $584 to $1,478 . . . , with 51% of workers at large employers
in 2016 having insurance with an annual deductible of [greater than] $1,000.” 155
HDHPs are ideal for patients who are healthy and only utilize the health plan’s services
seldomly or not at all.156 This allows healthy patients to have low monthly premiums and only
pay high out-of-pocket costs if they have a catastrophic health care event. Therefore, it is
theoretically possible that a healthy patient would never have to pay more than the low monthly
premium. Due to the favorable premium prices, however, many patients that are not healthy also
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select high deductible–high copayment hybrid plans, which leaves them with unaffordable
medication prices.157
The last cost-sharing initiative is potentially the most confusing and unexpected to patients:
the “donut-hole.” The “donut-hole” is a colloquial term for a coverage gap. 158 Essentially,
throughout a patient’s year of coverage, they begin on one side of the donut, traveling to the other
side and, when they hit the hole in the center, they lose prescription drug coverage. Patients enter
the donut-hole once the health plan has paid a certain amount of money towards cost-sharing.159
To get out of the donut-hole, however, the patient must spend a certain amount of money out-ofpocket. 160 Once the patient has reached the requisite total out-of-pocket expenditure, the
Catastrophic Benefit Coverage will set in and coverage resumes.161
There are several major problems with the donut-hole. First, patients’ biggest complaints
about the donut-hole center around not knowing when they will reach it. Most patients have no
idea how much their insurance has paid throughout the year; further, they have no idea how much
they have to spend to get out of the donut-hole. Absent spending several hours on hold waiting
for a customer service representation to assist, many patients struggle to obtain this critical
information. To add more confusion, in 2019 Medicare promised to eliminate the donut-hole by
2020. Instead, Medicare began calling it the “coverage-gap” and merely supplemented donut-hole
coverage slightly.162
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Second, to add insult to injury, the price that health plans use to determine if the patient
has met the upper limits to send them into the donut hole is based on the drug’s list price. 163 In
reality, however, the insurance company is receiving heavy subsidies in rebates from the PBM and
manufacturers on each prescription. Thus, the price that is calculated to push the patient into the
donut hole is higher than what the insurance company has actually paid.164 A study conducted in
2020 found that if health plans based beneficiary cost-sharing initiatives on the rebate price, rather
than the list price, annual patient out-of-pocket costs would reduce, on average, by $91.165 The
study also found that “[t]wenty percent of beneficiaries would see annual out-of-pocket savings of
more than $100, . . . five percent would see annual savings of more than $500, and nearly one
percent would see annual savings of more than $1,000.” 166
Lastly, donut-hole plans are often combined with high deductible and copayment plans in
the name of lowering patient premiums. 167 This means that throughout the year of coverage, a
patient could theoretically pay a high deductible, high copayments based on non-preferred or brand
name medications, out-of-pocket costs towards the donut hole, and then continue to pay
copayments after reaching the Catastrophic Benefit Period. Over a coverage year, many patients
pay thousands of dollars in cost-sharing pricing schemes. For example, the 2021 Medicare Part D
Proposed Standard Cost-Sharing Plan includes all three initiatives. The patient has an initial
deductible of up to $445; a coverage period that includes a 25% copayment on all prescriptions
and a payer upper limit of $3,097.50. Once the payer reaches the upper limit, the patient is in the
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coverage gap, during which they will pay up to $5,183.75 in copayments. Finally, once a patient
reaches a total out-of-pocket cost of $6,550, the Catastrophic Benefit Period takes effect and
coverage resumes.168
While increased cost-sharing schemes have huge impacts on a patient’s purse strings, they
can also significantly affect patient health. A 2015 poll found that about 25% of 648 respondents
“reported that they or another family member did not fill a prescription in the last year because of
cost[s].” 169 Further, patients prescribed brand-named medication were less likely to adhere to
their regimen compared to those prescribed a less costly generic medication.170 Lack of adherence
to medication regimens has been shown to lead to worse health outcomes and increased health
care costs overall. In fact, it is estimated that nonadherence contributes to “$105 billion in
avoidable health care costs annually.”171
V.

Resolutions

A. Previous Federal Action on PBMs
In recent years, Congress, the public, and former President Trump have focused increasing
attention on PBM unethical practices. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) first attempted to regulate PBM practices. The DOJ accused PBMs of violating the Federal
Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and the False Claims Act while negotiating rebate agreements with
manufacturers and failing to disclose such agreements to the government.172 The AKS makes it a
criminal offense to “‘knowingly and willfully’ offer, pay, solicit, or receive any ‘remuneration’ to
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induce referrals of items or services . . . under the federal health care programs.”173 The alleged
violation stemmed from the PBM practice of placing certain medications higher on formulary lists
based on the negotiated rebate instead of considerations such as the safety and efficacy of the
medication.174
These actions against PBMs, however, mostly resulted in private settlements with the
government.175 This is because the federal government concluded that PBMs’ rebate practices are
seemingly covered under the discount safe harbor provision of the AKS.176 The discount safe
harbor protects a federal health care program provider (i.e., manufacturer, physician or pharmacist)
from anti-kickback liability when providing a discount or reduction in price for an item or
service.177 Discounts are defined to include rebates “whose terms are ‘fixed and disclosed in
writing to the buyer at the time of initial purchase to which the discount applies, but which is not
given at the time of sale.’”178 While PBMs are not explicitly listed as covered providers under the
safe harbor provisions, it has become clear over the years that the federal government views PBM
rebates as falling within the statutory exemption.179
A. Recent Presidential Proposals
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Before the 2016 election, focus shifted towards skyrocketing drug prices when
pharmaceutical companies such as Valeant raised drug prices by forty-eight times overnight.180 If
there was one thing the Democrats and Republicans could agree on, it was that drug prices were
too high. Throughout much of his campaign, President Trump promised future legislation on drug
pricing and in 2018, he began zeroing in on PBMs. Trump proposed permitting PBMs and
manufacturers to continue to negotiate rebates freely while mandating that one-third of those
rebates be directly passed onto the patients at the point-of-sale.181 Trump also proposed revising
the current AKS to include restrictions on rebate practices.182 The Trump solution, however, also
proposed two new safe harbors: (1) point-of-sale reductions in price offered by drug manufacturers
directly to patients and (2) PBM service fees for claims adjudication. 183
The proposed regulations were intended to encourage up-front discounts for patients, rather
than cost-saving strategies that may or may not trickle down into lowered premiums.184 The White
House formally proposed the plan in February 2019. Trump, however, rescinded the proposal in
its entirety in July 2019.185 While White House officials pointed to pending legislation as the
excuse, many speculate that aggressive lobbying campaigns from two of the largest PBMs—CVS
and OptumRx—were ultimately responsible for the plan’s demise.186
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As the 2020 election etched eerily closer, and the COVID-19 pandemic mandated a hard
look at our country’s health care system, there was renewed hope that legislative efforts on drug
pricing would be revitalized. On July 24, 2020, President Trump issued three executive orders
regarding drug pricing practices.187 Those orders took aim at high drug prices by: (1) lowering the
cost of insulin, (2) allowing the international importation of medications, and (3) eliminating
kickbacks to middlemen (PBMs). First, Trump ordered Medicare and Medicaid to purchase
insulin at Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) 340B prices, which permits insulin and
other medications to be purchased at wholesale prices.188 Second, Trump ordered that patients be
permitted to import safe prescription medication from Canada or European countries at a lower
price. 189 Lastly, Trump ordered that rebates be passed onto patients at the point of sale, the
elimination of discount safe harbor protection in the AKS, and for new point-of-sale discount safe
harbors.190
On September 13, 2020, President Trump issued a fourth executive order addressing
manufacturer drug pricing.191 That proposal aimed to lower drug prices based on “The MostFavored Nation Price.” The order defines the most-favored nation price to mean
the lowest price, after adjusting for volume and differences in national gross
domestic product, for a pharmaceutical product that the drug manufacturer sells in
a member country of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) that has a comparable per-capita gross domestic product.192
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In effect, the executive order prevents Medicare Part D patients from paying more out-of-pocket
than the most-favored-nation price for that particular medication.193
There are several issues with and rebuttals to this executive action. In December 2019, the
House Democrats proposed similar legislation based on international pricing, which Trump
vetoed.194 Many industry leaders, and even Republican supporters, have criticized the action for
predicating prices on international standards. For industry leaders, such as Stephen Ubl, the chief
executive of PhRMA, the concern is that the policy is “unworkable” and “will give foreign
governments a say in how America provides access to treatments . . . .” 195 In contrast, many
Republicans are concerned that adopting drug prices from other countries is “effectively importing
socialism.”196
The rule was quickly challenged in December 2020 in a Maryland District Court by
PhRMA.197 While the rule was set to go into effect on January 1, 2021, the District Court judge
temporarily restrained the order.198 The court held that the executive order was in violation of
federal law because it bypassed the notice and comment rule-making procedures without good
cause.199
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At the same time, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) began working on regulatory
efforts to amend the AKS rebate safe harbor protections.200 The final rule first excluded PBMs
from the safe harbor provisions regarding reductions in price to Medicare Part D plan sponsors.201
Notably, however, the final rule did not include the same action for Medicaid plan sponsors.202
Next, the rule created new safe harbors that exempted point-of-sale reductions in price. The rule
states that reductions in price from manufacturers to plan sponsors under Medicare Part D or
Medicaid do not violate the AKS if (1) the reduction in price was set in advance; (2) the “full value
of the . . . price is provided to the dispensing pharmacy by the manufacturer . . . through point -ofsale chargeback[s]”; and (3) “the reduction in price [is] completely reflected in the price of the . .
. product at the time the pharmacy dispenses it to the beneficiary.” 203
Ideally, this rule should protect pharmacies from receiving low reimbursement rates from
either the plan sponsor or patient copayments. The rule recognizes, however, that this is unlikely
to happen.204 Thus, HHS promulgates that the pharmacies will need to be “‘made whole’ through
the chargeback process,” but offers no formal process for ensuring pharmacies receive the
chargebacks from the wholesalers, manufacturers, or PBMs. 205
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Lastly, the rule created a fixed fee safe harbor that allows PBMs to set a flat, fixed fee for
claims adjudication and service fees.206 The final rule was to take effect on January 29, 2021,
which would have required PBMs to negotiate these prices for contracts to take effect in 2022.207
The fate of Trump’s executive orders and regulatory action became unknown, however,
when newly-elected President Joe Biden took office on January 20, 2021. Within hours of
ascending the Presidency, President Biden executed a flurry of executive orders and
memorandums—many aimed specifically at reversing Trump-era actions.208 Among these orders,
President Biden required a regulatory freeze pending review on all agency actions that were (1)
issued after noon on January 20, 2021; (2) not yet published in the Federal Register; and (3) had
been published in the Federal Register, but had not yet taken effect.209 President Biden effectively
halted all regulatory action, including the final OIG rules, from taking effect until properly
reviewed and approved by the new administration.
Although we will have to wait to see what President Biden ultimately will choose to do
with Trump’s executive orders, his campaign website offers some insights concerning actions he
may take to address high drug prices. According to the website, Biden intends to propose that
Congress repeal the law that bars CMS from directly negotiating drug prices with the
manufacturers for Medicare patients. This would effectively allow the federal government to
bypass PBMs for rebate negotiations and formulary management.210 Biden also suggests limiting
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aggressive pricing for newly launched products. He proposes that the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) establish an independent review board to assess the value of the drug and
recommend a reasonable price. 211

Lastly, Biden intends to allow Americans to purchase

prescription drugs from other countries.
While these efforts will be a good first step to lowering drug prices, they will not control
PBMs’ aggressive pricing schemes or lack of reimbursement to pharmacies. Thus, while many
Americans on Medicare may benefit from lower copays and drug prices, Americans utilizing
private insurers and Medicaid will likely be left to pick up the tab in cost-shifting measures from
PBMs and manufacturers. Moreover, pharmacies will continue to face large DIR fees and low
reimbursement rates through PBM claim adjudication.
A. Future Regulatory and Legislative Efforts
While enhanced price regulation of the pharmaceutical industry is a good start, the federal
government needs to regulate the PBMs as well to create a system that will permanently shrink
drug costs. The failure to regulate the PBMs permits them to lie, cheat, and steal from the
manufacturers, pharmacies, insurance companies, and, ultimately, patients.

The incoming

administration has an opportunity to mold a new regulatory and legislative scheme to effectively
control drug pricing.
The quickest way to remedy PBMs’ predatory price gouging is for the executive branch to
regulate rebate practices with rule-making. First, President Biden should absolutely approve the
final OIG rule regarding AKS safe harbors. While the rule may not be the perfect solution, it’s a
step in the right direction. By carving out PBMs from the discount safe harbors, the existing AKS
rules prohibit PBMs from leveraging formulary placement based on the rebate. Formulary
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management would, instead, be based on therapeutic considerations, such as safety, efficacy, and
cost-benefit analyses. The OIG rules also allow for PBMs to negotiate rebates so long as there is
adequate transparency. This would ensure that cost savings through rebate negotiations are
actually passed on to patients and health plans. A huge pitfall of the OIG rules, however, is that
pharmacy reimbursement is still not guaranteed.
Next, CMS must remove the provisions that allow PBMs to implement DIR Fees. As
mentioned in Part III, CMS adopted DIR Fees to obtain a better understanding of the actual costs
of prescription drugs post-sale.212 DIR Fees have been utilized, however, to claw back additional
money from pharmacies on filled prescriptions. Thus, in conjunction with Congressional action
against PBM formulary management as discussed below, DIR Fees will no longer be necessary
for obtaining the actual costs of prescription drugs. Eliminating DIR Fees is essential to stopping
PBMs from clawing back additional money from the pharmacy after the point of sale.
While executive branch regulatory reform is needed to control PBM practices,
Congressional action is also required. First, President Biden has proposed that Congress repeal
the law that bars the federal government from negotiating rebates with the manufacturers directly.
This is an absolutely necessary step to decrease PBM power. Not only would such reform leave
formulary management to the federal government, it would provide greater prescription drug cost
transparency. Allowing the federal government to negotiate drug prices will increase top-down
transparency and create a predictable financial landscape for pharmacies.
Congress also should expand upon the executive branch’s regulatory efforts to eliminate
DIR Fees. While DIR Fees were initially created by CMS to obtain accurate pricing information,
PBMs have since utilized DIR Fees to apply hidden fees to pharmacies and engage in predatory
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audits.213 While some audits are necessary to ensure accurate claims adjudication and dispensing,
most PBM auditing practices are schemes to realize larger PBM profits. Congress, therefore,
should enact legislation concerning current auditing practices that carefully balances the PBM
interest in ensuring correct claims adjudication with the pharmacy interest in retaining profits from
selling prescriptions. For example, providing pharmacies a way to appeal DIR Fees or limiting
the types of audits PBMs can perform may yield the best results for both parties.
Next, Congress should require that PBMs pass 90–100% of any rebate through to insurance
companies and ensure the enforcement of that law by enaction legislation that demands strict
transparency rules between PBMs and their clients. Such laws would allow insurance companies
to realize the full benefits of the rebates provided by manufacturers. Thus, patient cost-sharing
measures, such as premiums, copayments, and high deductible plans, would be reduced or obsolete
in some cases. Deemphasizing rebates and negotiation as a means for competition between
manufacturers will drive competition through scientific innovation and, therefore, yielding optimal
clinical results for patients.
Fourth, Congress needs to attack PBMs predatory reimbursement rates to keep pharmacies
afloat. As a first step in that endeavor, Congress should eliminate preferred pharmacy network
negotiations. Preferred pharmacy networks leave pharmacies at a disadvantage by requiring a
discount on acquisition costs at about 12–15%.214 Thus, elimination of these take-or-leave-it deals
would allow pharmacies to sell their products at a traditional mark-up. Some may argue that this
will result in increased premium payments to patients. This is exactly why the 90% rebate pass
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through requirement is absolutely necessary to create a workable system. So long as payers fail to
receive adequate rebates from PBMs, they will short pharmacies on their reimbursement rates.
To ensure that pharmacies are guaranteed their mark-up price, Congress also needs to
implement a system in which PBMs are required to update their MAC lists for generic medications
in real time. Recall from Part III that PBMs are slow to correct MAC pricing when manufacturers
raise the prices on generics. 215

This causes the pharmacy’s acquisition costs to become

substantially higher than MAC and, therefore, the pharmacy loses money on each generic
prescription filled. Requiring that PBMs provide transparent, updated MAC lists will allow
pharmacies to fill generic medications from manufacturers that yield the highest profits.
Lastly, Congress should grant pharmacists federal provider status under Medicare and
Medicaid. Provider status will ensure that pharmacists are able to provide more immunizations,
POC testing (COVID-19, rapid flu test, rapid strep test), disease management services, streamlined
refills, contraceptives, and additional primary health care services. Pharmacists ought to be
properly reimbursed from Medicare for the clinical services they provide. This change would also
allow PBMs and insurance companies to shift cost-burdens associated with physician office visits
to the pharmacies. Most importantly, this will provide patients with increased access to health
care providers.
VI.

Conclusion

As drug costs continue to rise and people continue to get sicker, America can no longer
stand idly by and watch the system crash. As for Jeff Olson, he hopes to get off the “Low PaySlow Pay-No Pay” ride as soon as possible. His biggest worry if the Ferris Wheel keeps spinning?
The patients and pharmacists. When asked about the future of community pharmacy, Jeff replied:
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The PBMs are not here for patient care—they’re here for profit. This model
only benefits one group—the PBM. If this system doesn’t end . . . we’re going to
see [an increase] of another 2,000–4,000 rural [community] pharmacies closing.
Patients will be forced to either use mail order or travel up to 40 miles to an urban
area to find a pharmacy. . . . The only pharmacies that will survive this are those
that use enhanced [clinical] services.
Jeff realizes that if things do not change with the current PBM structure, health care access
for many patients will be extremely limited. In the meantime, Jeff plans to continue to offer high
level and innovative clinical services to bring in additional revenue to keep his doors open for as
long as possible. He hopes that these clinical services will provide meaningful and exciting work
to pharmacists.
In thinking about the effect PBMs have on the pharmacy profession landscape, Jeff
questions where all the new pharmacy graduates will go: “[Pharmacy] students are graduating with
huge amounts of debt and no way to pay for it—it’s an incredible disservice to new pharmacists.”
Even in his own pharmacy he has seen these limitations play out. For example, Jeff explains his
lack of ability to keep up with providing enhanced services due to low pharmacist staff numbers.
Jeff recognizes, however, that he also cannot afford to pay additional pharmacists due to the money
he loses from PBMs.
Even though the system seems to be working against him, Jeff says he will continue to
keep fighting for patients, pharmacists, and pharmacy owners. While Jeff’s story is the reality for
many other pharmacy owners, it does not have to continue to be. Implementing regulatory and
legislative reform against PBMs in three key areas—rebates, reimbursement rates, and DIR Fees—
will create meaningful change in the life of pharmacies, pharmacists, and patients.
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